| The Drug fLaws.com analysis of the drug laws by dennis mcbride |
Officer! Arrest
these two - they're
using drugs!!
these two - they're
using drugs!!
| Disregarding a recent ruling of the US Supreme Court that Federal law supercedes State law on drug use, these two openly defy the law and dare to be arrested. |
| Age: 45 Resident of: Oroville, California Medical Condition: Chronic back pain and spasms. |
| Age: 38 years old Resident of: Oakland, California Medical Conditions: Inoperable brain tumor, life-threatening wasting syndrome, chronic pain disorders, seizure disorder, nausea, Scoliosis, TMJ, Endometriosis, Uterine tumor, and many other documented medical conditions. |
Diane Monson smokes pot to
relieve back pain on the same day
she lost her Supreme Court case.
Associated Press photo by Max Whittaker
relieve back pain on the same day
she lost her Supreme Court case.
Associated Press photo by Max Whittaker
Angel Raich of Oakland, who said
she smokes marijuana every two
hours -- about 9 pounds a year -- to
fuel her appetite.
she smokes marijuana every two
hours -- about 9 pounds a year -- to
fuel her appetite.
"I will continue to medicate with cannabis."
-Angel Raich
-Angel Raich
GONZALES, ATTORNEY GENERAL, et al. v. RAICH et al.
certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
No. 03-1454.Argued November 29, 2004--Decided June 6, 2005
Syllabus
California's Compassionate Use Act authorizes limited marijuana use
for medicinal purposes. Respondents Raich and Monson are
California residents who both use doctor-recommended marijuana for
serious medical conditions. After federal Drug Enforcement
Administration (DEA) agents seized and destroyed all six of Monson's
cannabis plants, respondents brought this action seeking injunctive
and declaratory relief prohibiting the enforcement of the federal
Controlled Substances Act (CSA) to the extent it prevents them from
possessing, obtaining, or manufacturing cannabis for their personal
medical use. Respondents claim that enforcing the CSA against them
would violate the Commerce Clause and other constitutional
provisions. The District Court denied respondents' motion for a
preliminary injunction, but the Ninth Circuit reversed, finding that they
had demonstrated a strong likelihood of success on the claim that the
CSA is an unconstitutional exercise of Congress' Commerce Clause
authority as applied to the intrastate, noncommercial cultivation and
possession of cannabis for personal medical purposes as
recommended by a patient's physician pursuant to valid California
state law. The court relied heavily on United States v. Lopez, 514 U.
S. 549, and United States v. Morrison, 529 U. S. 598, to hold that this
separate class of purely local activities was beyond the reach of
federal power.
Held: Congress' Commerce Clause authority includes the power to
prohibit the local cultivation and use of marijuana in compliance with
California law. Pp. 6-31.
(a) For the purposes of consolidating various drug laws into a
comprehensive statute, providing meaningful regulation over
legitimate sources of drugs to prevent diversion into illegal channels,
and strengthening law enforcement tools against international and
interstate drug trafficking, Congress enacted the Comprehensive
Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, Title II of which is the
CSA. To effectuate the statutory goals, Congress devised a closed
regulatory system making it unlawful to manufacture, distribute,
dispense, or possess any controlled substance except as authorized
by the CSA. 21 U. S. C. §§841(a)(1), 844(a). All controlled
substances are classified into five schedules, §812, based on their
accepted medical uses, their potential for abuse, and their
psychological and physical effects on the body, §§811, 812.
Marijuana is classified as a Schedule I substance, §812(c), based on
its high potential for abuse, no accepted medical use, and no
accepted safety for use in medically supervised treatment, §812(b)
(1). This classification renders the manufacture, distribution, or
possession of marijuana a criminal offense. §§841(a)(1), 844(a). Pp.
6-11.
(b) Congress' power to regulate purely local activities that are part of
an economic "class of activities" that have a substantial effect on
interstate commerce is firmly established. See, e.g., Perez v. United
States, 402 U. S. 146, 151. If Congress decides that the " 'total
incidence' " of a practice poses a threat to a national market, it may
regulate the entire class. See, e.g., id., at 154-155. Of particular
relevance here is Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U. S. 111, 127-128, where,
in rejecting the appellee farmer's contention that Congress' admitted
power to regulate the production of wheat for commerce did not
authorize federal regulation of wheat production intended wholly for
the appellee's own consumption, the Court established that Congress
can regulate purely intrastate activity that is not itself "commercial," i.
e., not produced for sale, if it concludes that failure to regulate that
class of activity would undercut the regulation of the interstate market
in that commodity. The similarities between this case and Wickard are
striking. In both cases, the regulation is squarely within Congress'
commerce power because production of the commodity meant for
home consumption, be it wheat or marijuana, has a substantial effect
on supply and demand in the national market for that commodity. In
assessing the scope of Congress' Commerce Clause authority, the
Court need not determine whether respondents' activities, taken in
the aggregate, substantially affect interstate commerce in fact, but
only whether a "rational basis" exists for so concluding. E.g., Lopez,
514 U. S., at 557. Given the enforcement difficulties that attend
distinguishing between marijuana cultivated locally and marijuana
grown elsewhere, 21 U. S. C. §801(5), and concerns about diversion
into illicit channels, the Court has no difficulty concluding that
Congress had a rational basis for believing that failure to regulate the
intrastate manufacture and possession of marijuana would leave a
gaping hole in the CSA. Pp. 12-20.
(c) Respondents' heavy reliance on Lopez and Morrison overlooks
the larger context of modern-era Commerce Clause jurisprudence
preserved by those cases, while also reading those cases far too
broadly. The statutory challenges at issue there were markedly
different from the challenge here. Respondents ask the Court to
excise individual applications of a concededly valid comprehensive
statutory scheme. In contrast, in both Lopez and Morrison, the parties
asserted that a particular statute or provision fell outside Congress'
commerce power in its entirety. This distinction is pivotal for the Court
has often reiterated that "[w]here the class of activities is regulated
and that class is within the reach of federal power, the courts have no
power 'to excise, as trivial, individual instances' of the class." Perez,
402 U. S., at 154. Moreover, the Court emphasized that the laws at
issue in Lopez and Morrison had nothing to do with "commerce" or
any sort of economic enterprise. See Lopez, 514 U. S., at 561;
Morrison, 529 U. S., at 610. In contrast, the CSA regulates
quintessentially economic activities: the production, distribution, and
consumption of commodities for which there is an established, and
lucrative, interstate market. Prohibiting the intrastate possession or
manufacture of an article of commerce is a rational means of
regulating commerce in that product. The Ninth Circuit cast doubt on
the CSA's constitutionality by isolating a distinct class of activities that
it held to be beyond the reach of federal power: the intrastate,
noncommercial cultivation, possession, and use of marijuana for
personal medical purposes on the advice of a physician and in
accordance with state law. However, Congress clearly acted rationally
in determining that this subdivided class of activities is an essential
part of the larger regulatory scheme. The case comes down to the
claim that a locally cultivated product that is used domestically rather
than sold on the open market is not subject to federal regulation.
Given the CSA's findings and the undisputed magnitude of the
commercial market for marijuana, Wickard and its progeny foreclose
that claim. Pp. 20-30.
352 F. 3d 1222, vacated and remanded.
Stevens, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Kennedy,
Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ., joined. Scalia, J., filed an opinion
concurring in the judgment. O’Connor, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in
which Rehnquist, C. J., and Thomas, J., joined as to all but Part III.
Thomas, J., filed a dissenting opinion.
_________________________________
certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
No. 03-1454.Argued November 29, 2004--Decided June 6, 2005
Syllabus
California's Compassionate Use Act authorizes limited marijuana use
for medicinal purposes. Respondents Raich and Monson are
California residents who both use doctor-recommended marijuana for
serious medical conditions. After federal Drug Enforcement
Administration (DEA) agents seized and destroyed all six of Monson's
cannabis plants, respondents brought this action seeking injunctive
and declaratory relief prohibiting the enforcement of the federal
Controlled Substances Act (CSA) to the extent it prevents them from
possessing, obtaining, or manufacturing cannabis for their personal
medical use. Respondents claim that enforcing the CSA against them
would violate the Commerce Clause and other constitutional
provisions. The District Court denied respondents' motion for a
preliminary injunction, but the Ninth Circuit reversed, finding that they
had demonstrated a strong likelihood of success on the claim that the
CSA is an unconstitutional exercise of Congress' Commerce Clause
authority as applied to the intrastate, noncommercial cultivation and
possession of cannabis for personal medical purposes as
recommended by a patient's physician pursuant to valid California
state law. The court relied heavily on United States v. Lopez, 514 U.
S. 549, and United States v. Morrison, 529 U. S. 598, to hold that this
separate class of purely local activities was beyond the reach of
federal power.
Held: Congress' Commerce Clause authority includes the power to
prohibit the local cultivation and use of marijuana in compliance with
California law. Pp. 6-31.
(a) For the purposes of consolidating various drug laws into a
comprehensive statute, providing meaningful regulation over
legitimate sources of drugs to prevent diversion into illegal channels,
and strengthening law enforcement tools against international and
interstate drug trafficking, Congress enacted the Comprehensive
Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, Title II of which is the
CSA. To effectuate the statutory goals, Congress devised a closed
regulatory system making it unlawful to manufacture, distribute,
dispense, or possess any controlled substance except as authorized
by the CSA. 21 U. S. C. §§841(a)(1), 844(a). All controlled
substances are classified into five schedules, §812, based on their
accepted medical uses, their potential for abuse, and their
psychological and physical effects on the body, §§811, 812.
Marijuana is classified as a Schedule I substance, §812(c), based on
its high potential for abuse, no accepted medical use, and no
accepted safety for use in medically supervised treatment, §812(b)
(1). This classification renders the manufacture, distribution, or
possession of marijuana a criminal offense. §§841(a)(1), 844(a). Pp.
6-11.
(b) Congress' power to regulate purely local activities that are part of
an economic "class of activities" that have a substantial effect on
interstate commerce is firmly established. See, e.g., Perez v. United
States, 402 U. S. 146, 151. If Congress decides that the " 'total
incidence' " of a practice poses a threat to a national market, it may
regulate the entire class. See, e.g., id., at 154-155. Of particular
relevance here is Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U. S. 111, 127-128, where,
in rejecting the appellee farmer's contention that Congress' admitted
power to regulate the production of wheat for commerce did not
authorize federal regulation of wheat production intended wholly for
the appellee's own consumption, the Court established that Congress
can regulate purely intrastate activity that is not itself "commercial," i.
e., not produced for sale, if it concludes that failure to regulate that
class of activity would undercut the regulation of the interstate market
in that commodity. The similarities between this case and Wickard are
striking. In both cases, the regulation is squarely within Congress'
commerce power because production of the commodity meant for
home consumption, be it wheat or marijuana, has a substantial effect
on supply and demand in the national market for that commodity. In
assessing the scope of Congress' Commerce Clause authority, the
Court need not determine whether respondents' activities, taken in
the aggregate, substantially affect interstate commerce in fact, but
only whether a "rational basis" exists for so concluding. E.g., Lopez,
514 U. S., at 557. Given the enforcement difficulties that attend
distinguishing between marijuana cultivated locally and marijuana
grown elsewhere, 21 U. S. C. §801(5), and concerns about diversion
into illicit channels, the Court has no difficulty concluding that
Congress had a rational basis for believing that failure to regulate the
intrastate manufacture and possession of marijuana would leave a
gaping hole in the CSA. Pp. 12-20.
(c) Respondents' heavy reliance on Lopez and Morrison overlooks
the larger context of modern-era Commerce Clause jurisprudence
preserved by those cases, while also reading those cases far too
broadly. The statutory challenges at issue there were markedly
different from the challenge here. Respondents ask the Court to
excise individual applications of a concededly valid comprehensive
statutory scheme. In contrast, in both Lopez and Morrison, the parties
asserted that a particular statute or provision fell outside Congress'
commerce power in its entirety. This distinction is pivotal for the Court
has often reiterated that "[w]here the class of activities is regulated
and that class is within the reach of federal power, the courts have no
power 'to excise, as trivial, individual instances' of the class." Perez,
402 U. S., at 154. Moreover, the Court emphasized that the laws at
issue in Lopez and Morrison had nothing to do with "commerce" or
any sort of economic enterprise. See Lopez, 514 U. S., at 561;
Morrison, 529 U. S., at 610. In contrast, the CSA regulates
quintessentially economic activities: the production, distribution, and
consumption of commodities for which there is an established, and
lucrative, interstate market. Prohibiting the intrastate possession or
manufacture of an article of commerce is a rational means of
regulating commerce in that product. The Ninth Circuit cast doubt on
the CSA's constitutionality by isolating a distinct class of activities that
it held to be beyond the reach of federal power: the intrastate,
noncommercial cultivation, possession, and use of marijuana for
personal medical purposes on the advice of a physician and in
accordance with state law. However, Congress clearly acted rationally
in determining that this subdivided class of activities is an essential
part of the larger regulatory scheme. The case comes down to the
claim that a locally cultivated product that is used domestically rather
than sold on the open market is not subject to federal regulation.
Given the CSA's findings and the undisputed magnitude of the
commercial market for marijuana, Wickard and its progeny foreclose
that claim. Pp. 20-30.
352 F. 3d 1222, vacated and remanded.
Stevens, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Kennedy,
Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ., joined. Scalia, J., filed an opinion
concurring in the judgment. O’Connor, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in
which Rehnquist, C. J., and Thomas, J., joined as to all but Part III.
Thomas, J., filed a dissenting opinion.
_________________________________
| READ THE FULL CASE |
