| The Drug fLaws.com analysis of the drug laws by dennis mcbride |
| "The wicked man does deceptive work." |
| -Proverbs 11:18 |
| In his 11 years on the force, Mabanag said that he had shot four suspects - killing one - and six dogs. |
Clarence Mabanag
Matthew Horning
Jude Siapno
| "The Riders" were an elite group of Oakland's police force that rookies often looked towards with envy. Their specialty: bringing in reputed drug dealers in record numbers from the crime-plagued streets of West Oakland. |
| The Mission of the Oakland Police Department is to provide competent, effective public safety services to all persons with the highest regard for human dignity through efficient, professional, and ethical law enforcemnet and crime prevention practices. -Website |
Thomas Coleman at trial
and
undercover.
undercover.
| [After Prohibition; An Adult Approach to Drug Policies in the 21st Century; Edited by Timothy Lynch; Cato Institute; 2001] |
| "jailing people because they put chemicals into their bloodstream is a gross misuse of the police power and criminal law. Jailing drug users does not lessen drug use." |
| -Joseph D. McNamara; former police chief of San Jose, California. |
(click)
| A full-sized 4th edition of Drug War Facts is available free at the above website. |
| Help Students Losing Financial Aid for College Because of Drug Convictions Get Their Aid Back |
| CLICK HERE to send a letter to your US Representative. |
| CLICK HERE to send a letter to your state Senators. |
Read more---
pp. 100-101
pp. 100-101
Read more---
p. 100
p. 100
| Why Our Drug Laws Have Failed...; Judge James P. Gray; 2001 |
 |
 |
 |
 |
 |
 |
 |
THE RIDERS CASE
A senior police officer for the city of Oakland, CA., Clarence Mabanag, and fellow
officers Jude Siapno and Matthew Horning were charged with "filing false police
reports and conspiring to hide misdeeds, including beatings, and the planting of
evidence" resulting from testimony of a another officer Keith Batt. Mabanag tried
to refute Batt's accusations by calling him a "cocky know-it-all," a "coward," and
described Batt as "a little bitch." Mabanag conceded that his methods violated
department policy, but said that was the way that he had been broken in.
Mabanag had been the senior officer with the responsibility of training Batt as a
rookie on the streets. Batt quit after two weeks of becoming a police officer for
the city of Pleasanton.
In his 11 years on the force, Mabanag said that he had shot four suspects -
killing one - and six dogs. Mabanag also said he had racked up 22 internal
affairs complaints but none were sustained. [San Francisco Chronicle; April 16,
2003; p. A18]
In 2002, prosecutors dismissed about 90 cases, mostly drug-related, with
connections to these officers and in February 2003, the City of Oakland settled
119 lawsuits for $10.5 million.
Mabanag's attorney maintained that the officers were pressured into aggressive
action by the Chief of Police's drug enforcement campaign entitled: SANE.
(Strategic Application of Narcotic Enforcement). Promoting the campaign, Police
Chief Richard Word said in a newsletter, "We must work to create an
environment in Oakland that is hostile to criminals." Word explained that he
encouraged officers "to go after the root cause of crime in the city, drug abuse,
drug use, and drug sales." (id.)
The trial of the four Oakland police officers who called themselves "The Riders"
ended in acquittal for three of them. The fourth, and alleged ringleader, Officer
Frank Vazquez, had fled to Mexico to escape prosecution. The year-long trial
resulted in the state's longest jury deliberations with the judge ordering the jury
to return again and again to continue when they announced they had
deadlocked.
The officers worked the nightshift in one of Oakland's roughest neighborhoods.
Over the years, Oakland had been plagued with high rates of homicide, many
unsolved and few arrests. In fact the defense lawyers had argued "their clients
were under immense pressure to reduce crime and were simply doing the
bidding of a new regime that demanded they wrestle the city streets back from
criminals," said a news article. [San Francisco Chronicle; Oct. 1, 2003; p. C4]
The jurors refused to respond to questions as they left the court, but the next day
six of them (three women and three men) announced they wanted the officers
retried, with three of the six apologizing for not convicting them.
[San Francisco Chronicle; Oct. 2, 2003; p. A1]
"It's a strong case," said one of the jurors. “We would have come back with
convictions if we didn't have such a bad dynamic in our jury." (id.)
The six blamed the jury foreman ("the bad dynamic") and two others for nullifying
the case. "They really messed things up. We never really got on track," said one
juror. (id.) They said the foreman, a law student, "polarized jurors on the first day
of deliberations." (id.)
A senior police officer for the city of Oakland, CA., Clarence Mabanag, and fellow
officers Jude Siapno and Matthew Horning were charged with "filing false police
reports and conspiring to hide misdeeds, including beatings, and the planting of
evidence" resulting from testimony of a another officer Keith Batt. Mabanag tried
to refute Batt's accusations by calling him a "cocky know-it-all," a "coward," and
described Batt as "a little bitch." Mabanag conceded that his methods violated
department policy, but said that was the way that he had been broken in.
Mabanag had been the senior officer with the responsibility of training Batt as a
rookie on the streets. Batt quit after two weeks of becoming a police officer for
the city of Pleasanton.
In his 11 years on the force, Mabanag said that he had shot four suspects -
killing one - and six dogs. Mabanag also said he had racked up 22 internal
affairs complaints but none were sustained. [San Francisco Chronicle; April 16,
2003; p. A18]
In 2002, prosecutors dismissed about 90 cases, mostly drug-related, with
connections to these officers and in February 2003, the City of Oakland settled
119 lawsuits for $10.5 million.
Mabanag's attorney maintained that the officers were pressured into aggressive
action by the Chief of Police's drug enforcement campaign entitled: SANE.
(Strategic Application of Narcotic Enforcement). Promoting the campaign, Police
Chief Richard Word said in a newsletter, "We must work to create an
environment in Oakland that is hostile to criminals." Word explained that he
encouraged officers "to go after the root cause of crime in the city, drug abuse,
drug use, and drug sales." (id.)
The trial of the four Oakland police officers who called themselves "The Riders"
ended in acquittal for three of them. The fourth, and alleged ringleader, Officer
Frank Vazquez, had fled to Mexico to escape prosecution. The year-long trial
resulted in the state's longest jury deliberations with the judge ordering the jury
to return again and again to continue when they announced they had
deadlocked.
The officers worked the nightshift in one of Oakland's roughest neighborhoods.
Over the years, Oakland had been plagued with high rates of homicide, many
unsolved and few arrests. In fact the defense lawyers had argued "their clients
were under immense pressure to reduce crime and were simply doing the
bidding of a new regime that demanded they wrestle the city streets back from
criminals," said a news article. [San Francisco Chronicle; Oct. 1, 2003; p. C4]
The jurors refused to respond to questions as they left the court, but the next day
six of them (three women and three men) announced they wanted the officers
retried, with three of the six apologizing for not convicting them.
[San Francisco Chronicle; Oct. 2, 2003; p. A1]
"It's a strong case," said one of the jurors. “We would have come back with
convictions if we didn't have such a bad dynamic in our jury." (id.)
The six blamed the jury foreman ("the bad dynamic") and two others for nullifying
the case. "They really messed things up. We never really got on track," said one
juror. (id.) They said the foreman, a law student, "polarized jurors on the first day
of deliberations." (id.)
| NOTE: I checked with the website for America's Most Wanted and they don't have FRANK VASQUEZ listed on their Fugitive List. Had he been accused of street dealing or belonged to a street gang, he would most definitely be listed. These phony police programs do not like to call attention to the criminal life-styles of their own profession. -dm] |
- "He (the foreman) said there was
enough reasonable doubt... and
nothing was going to change his
mind. That was the first 15 minutes. It
was pretty much downhill from there."
| (woman juror) (id.) |
- "He said we would never get the
votes for conviction, so our options
were acquittal or mistrial. Most of us
wanted to go through evidence
objectively but he had to put his spin
on everything" and "ridiculed
everyone who disagreed with him."
| (woman juror) (id.) |
The six jurors accused the jury foreman of being
"disruptive throughout the deliberations and spent
months pressuring the others to acquit the officers."
(id.) The jury had deliberated for 55 days.
"disruptive throughout the deliberations and spent
months pressuring the others to acquit the officers."
(id.) The jury had deliberated for 55 days.
- "We were really upset, and we couldn't do
nothing. We told the judge and he said he
didn't want to know what was going on in the
jury room."
| -a juror. [Oakland Tribune; Oct. 2, 2003; NEWS 7] |
"Law precluded [Judge Leo] Dorado from tampering with jury deliberations." (id.)
"I feel I need to apologize to the community," said one woman juror. Those
defendants were guilty but we failed to convict them." [San Francisco Chronicle;
Oct. 1, 2003; p. C4]
[The San Francisco district attorney refiled the case on the officers. Case
pending.]
"I feel I need to apologize to the community," said one woman juror. Those
defendants were guilty but we failed to convict them." [San Francisco Chronicle;
Oct. 1, 2003; p. C4]
[The San Francisco district attorney refiled the case on the officers. Case
pending.]
2. A Texas judge agreed with the request of the prosecution that 38 drug
convictions in Tulia, Texas, be overturned as they conceded that their evidence
relied on the testimony of undercover officer Thomas Coleman after Coleman
and other witnesses testified, describing "his troubled career, unorthodox
methods, pervasive errors, combustible temperament and apparent racism."
(Most of the defendants were black.) The judge stated, "Coleman is simply not
a credible witness under oath." The judge said he would recommend that a
higher court overturn the conviction of everyone convicted in the sting. In the
meantime, the 16 people still in prison will remain there. [Marin Independent
Journal; April 2, 2003; p. A3] [NOTE: The 16 have since been released.]
3. Joseph D. McNamara was a New York policeman in the late 1950's. He
wrote that he "watched in frustration" as heroin epidemic swept "whole families
and neighborhoods"
McNamara has an article in the book After Prohibition entitled: The War the
Police Didn't Declare and Can't Win. (pp. 119-126) In it, McNamara calls himself
and other police officers "drug warriors." He asserts that "Drug arrests statistics
serve the same purpose enemy body counts served during the Vietnam War."
As a policeman of 35 years, McNamara feels that "jailing people because they
put chemicals into their bloodstream is a gross misuse of the police power and
criminal law. Jailing drug users does not lessen drug use."
McNamara is working on a new book tentatively entitled: "Gangster Cops: The
Hidden Cost of America's War on Drugs." As the title suggests, it is about "bad
boys" - cops, that is. McNamara plans to report on police officers that use the
drug laws to commit their own crimes, and how the police use society's
antagonism against drugs to falsify reports, arrests, and account for their own
misdeeds; officers who deal drugs and steal them, from drug dealers OR their
own police stations!
McNamara notes there are over 600,000 police officers and almost everyone of
them adhere to a "Code of Silence." He would know, Joe is also formerly the
police chief of San Jose, California.
convictions in Tulia, Texas, be overturned as they conceded that their evidence
relied on the testimony of undercover officer Thomas Coleman after Coleman
and other witnesses testified, describing "his troubled career, unorthodox
methods, pervasive errors, combustible temperament and apparent racism."
(Most of the defendants were black.) The judge stated, "Coleman is simply not
a credible witness under oath." The judge said he would recommend that a
higher court overturn the conviction of everyone convicted in the sting. In the
meantime, the 16 people still in prison will remain there. [Marin Independent
Journal; April 2, 2003; p. A3] [NOTE: The 16 have since been released.]
3. Joseph D. McNamara was a New York policeman in the late 1950's. He
wrote that he "watched in frustration" as heroin epidemic swept "whole families
and neighborhoods"
McNamara has an article in the book After Prohibition entitled: The War the
Police Didn't Declare and Can't Win. (pp. 119-126) In it, McNamara calls himself
and other police officers "drug warriors." He asserts that "Drug arrests statistics
serve the same purpose enemy body counts served during the Vietnam War."
As a policeman of 35 years, McNamara feels that "jailing people because they
put chemicals into their bloodstream is a gross misuse of the police power and
criminal law. Jailing drug users does not lessen drug use."
McNamara is working on a new book tentatively entitled: "Gangster Cops: The
Hidden Cost of America's War on Drugs." As the title suggests, it is about "bad
boys" - cops, that is. McNamara plans to report on police officers that use the
drug laws to commit their own crimes, and how the police use society's
antagonism against drugs to falsify reports, arrests, and account for their own
misdeeds; officers who deal drugs and steal them, from drug dealers OR their
own police stations!
McNamara notes there are over 600,000 police officers and almost everyone of
them adhere to a "Code of Silence." He would know, Joe is also formerly the
police chief of San Jose, California.
4. MIAMI. 2003: "Four Miami police officers were given federal prison
sentences ranging from about a year to three years for planting guns after
questionable police shootings or lying to cover them up." [San Francisco
Chronicle; Oct. 30, 2003; p. A3]
"Three others were acquitted and four face retrials after jury deadlocks." (id.)
sentences ranging from about a year to three years for planting guns after
questionable police shootings or lying to cover them up." [San Francisco
Chronicle; Oct. 30, 2003; p. A3]
"Three others were acquitted and four face retrials after jury deadlocks." (id.)
OTHER LAW ENFORCEMENT
1. On average, half of all police officers convicted as a result of FBI-led
corruption cases between 1993 and 1997 were convicted for drug-related
offenses.
1. On average, half of all police officers convicted as a result of FBI-led
corruption cases between 1993 and 1997 were convicted for drug-related
offenses.
| [DrugWarFacts.org] (Source: General Accounting Office; 1998) |
2. "Since 1995, 10 police officers from Philadelphia's 39th District have
been charged with planting drugs on suspects, shaking down dealers for
hundreds of thousands of dollars and breaking into homes to steal drugs and
cash."
been charged with planting drugs on suspects, shaking down dealers for
hundreds of thousands of dollars and breaking into homes to steal drugs and
cash."
| [DrugWarFacts.org] (Source: General Accounting Office; 1998) |
3. In New Orleans, 11 police officers were convicted of accepting nearly
$100,000 from undercover agents to protect a cocaine supply warehouse
containing 286 pounds of cocaine. The undercover portion of the investigation
was terminated when a witness was killed under orders from a New Orleans
police officer.
$100,000 from undercover agents to protect a cocaine supply warehouse
containing 286 pounds of cocaine. The undercover portion of the investigation
was terminated when a witness was killed under orders from a New Orleans
police officer.
| [DrugWarFacts.org] (Source: General Accounting Office; 1998) |
4. 1998 report: Police officers engaged in stealing money and/or drugs from
drug dealers, selling stolen drugs, and protecting drug operations in the
following cities: Atlanta, Chicago, Cleveland, Detroit, Los Angeles, Miami, New
Orleans, New York, Philadelphia, Savannah, and Washington D.C.
drug dealers, selling stolen drugs, and protecting drug operations in the
following cities: Atlanta, Chicago, Cleveland, Detroit, Los Angeles, Miami, New
Orleans, New York, Philadelphia, Savannah, and Washington D.C.
| [DrugWarFacts.org] (Source: General Accounting Office; 1998) |
5. In April 2000, former Dallas police officers Quentis Roper and Daniel
Maples were convicted of extorting more than $125,000 from drug dealers and
illegal immigrants and falsifying evidence against those who refused to pay.
Maples were convicted of extorting more than $125,000 from drug dealers and
illegal immigrants and falsifying evidence against those who refused to pay.
| [Prison Legal News; July 2003; p. 5] |
6. "Law enforcement in many jurisdictions has recruited
juveniles to act as confidential informants in adult drug
transactions. Tragically, some of these recruited juveniles
have been killed by drug traffickers when their work for the
police was discovered."
juveniles to act as confidential informants in adult drug
transactions. Tragically, some of these recruited juveniles
have been killed by drug traffickers when their work for the
police was discovered."
| [Source: Why Our Drug Laws Have Failed...; Judge James P. Gray; 2001; p. 53; Citing: "Slain Teen Informant's Family Sues Brea Police," Orange County Register, August 15, 1998, by Stuart Pfeifer, and; "Snitch Jr.," California Lawyer, April 2000, p. 44] |
7. "In May of 2001, the Charlotte Observer reported that Federal Drug
Enforcement Administration agents in the San Juan Office were instructed to file
false reports in order to obtain more funding from the DEA."
Enforcement Administration agents in the San Juan Office were instructed to file
false reports in order to obtain more funding from the DEA."
| [Drug War Addiction; by Sheriff Bill Masters; Accurate Press; 2001; p. 53] |
8. On March 6, 2003, the Houston Police Department announced that the
department's DNA crime lab had been shut down due to possible criminal and
other misconduct. A December 2002 report found that the lab technicians were
inadequately trained and that they routinely misinterpreted data and kept
records in disarray. All of the lab's errors had been pro-prosecution, never favor
of the defense. Other crime labs around the nation, including those in
Oklahoma City, Montana, and Washington State have also been accused of
performing slipshod work and providing false or misleading testimony. In 1997,
13 lab technicians in the FBI crime lab were accused of making scientific errors
and aiding prosecutors with biased testimony. None of the technicians were
fired or prosecuted. The Justice Department has identified about 3,000 criminal
cases that may have been adversely affected.
department's DNA crime lab had been shut down due to possible criminal and
other misconduct. A December 2002 report found that the lab technicians were
inadequately trained and that they routinely misinterpreted data and kept
records in disarray. All of the lab's errors had been pro-prosecution, never favor
of the defense. Other crime labs around the nation, including those in
Oklahoma City, Montana, and Washington State have also been accused of
performing slipshod work and providing false or misleading testimony. In 1997,
13 lab technicians in the FBI crime lab were accused of making scientific errors
and aiding prosecutors with biased testimony. None of the technicians were
fired or prosecuted. The Justice Department has identified about 3,000 criminal
cases that may have been adversely affected.
| [Prison Legal News; by Michael Rigby; July 2003; p. 26] |
"After being a drug warrior for many
years - and being good at it - after
receiving the DEA's award for
outstanding achievements in the field
of drug law enforcement, I realized I had
failed my community by not carefully
analyzing the problem. I had become
part of the drug hysteria."
years - and being good at it - after
receiving the DEA's award for
outstanding achievements in the field
of drug law enforcement, I realized I had
failed my community by not carefully
analyzing the problem. I had become
part of the drug hysteria."
| -Sheriff Bill Masters [DrugWar Addiction; 2001; p. 18] |
THE M.O. (Method of Operation) IS THE SAME
Where does this hostile lack of human rights come from? Civil law
enforcement is specially trained to cope with the society they police. There are
extreme efforts to teach licensed security to enforce laws in a civil manner.
Sure, there is the "human element" and then there is the probability of
mistakes, but there is another element involved here. It is the impression by
civil leaders much the same as a child learns from grownups.
The military has an enormous influence on civil police officers. In fact, in many
instances, the military trains police forces. Many police officers and jail/prison
guards are former military soldiers. But most of all, local police are influenced
by the tactics used by federal agencies.
1. Dr. Humberto Alvarez-Machain, a gynecologist in Mexico, was wanted by
the DEA. When they could not get the Mexican government to hand him over,
they simply kidnapped him and had him stand trial in Texas. Chief Justice
William Rehnquist, writing for the majority, found that the kidnapping violated no
express treaty and ordered him held. Dr. Alvarez-Machain was acquitted at trial.
In 1990, the doctor was kidnapped by Mexicans who were paid $60,000 by US
officers. He was held for 2 years before being acquitted. Alvarez sued for
damages and won $25,000 against one Mexican officer and won the right to
sue the US government, but the US Supreme Court overruled both decisions by
the Ninth Circuit Court stating Alvarez had no basis for a lawsuit as his situation
was not the kind of severe abuse that violated universally held international
standards.
Where does this hostile lack of human rights come from? Civil law
enforcement is specially trained to cope with the society they police. There are
extreme efforts to teach licensed security to enforce laws in a civil manner.
Sure, there is the "human element" and then there is the probability of
mistakes, but there is another element involved here. It is the impression by
civil leaders much the same as a child learns from grownups.
The military has an enormous influence on civil police officers. In fact, in many
instances, the military trains police forces. Many police officers and jail/prison
guards are former military soldiers. But most of all, local police are influenced
by the tactics used by federal agencies.
1. Dr. Humberto Alvarez-Machain, a gynecologist in Mexico, was wanted by
the DEA. When they could not get the Mexican government to hand him over,
they simply kidnapped him and had him stand trial in Texas. Chief Justice
William Rehnquist, writing for the majority, found that the kidnapping violated no
express treaty and ordered him held. Dr. Alvarez-Machain was acquitted at trial.
In 1990, the doctor was kidnapped by Mexicans who were paid $60,000 by US
officers. He was held for 2 years before being acquitted. Alvarez sued for
damages and won $25,000 against one Mexican officer and won the right to
sue the US government, but the US Supreme Court overruled both decisions by
the Ninth Circuit Court stating Alvarez had no basis for a lawsuit as his situation
was not the kind of severe abuse that violated universally held international
standards.
- [The highest court in the US is saying kidnapping is
not "severe abuse" as long as our government does
it. -dm]
2. "In 1994, Juan Matta-Ballesteros was forcibly abducted from his home in
Honduras by Honduran special troops and four U.S. marshals and brought to
this country for trial. But first, he said, he was hooded, beaten, burned, and
tortured with a stun gun that was applied to various parts of this body, including
his feet and genitals."
Honduras by Honduran special troops and four U.S. marshals and brought to
this country for trial. But first, he said, he was hooded, beaten, burned, and
tortured with a stun gun that was applied to various parts of this body, including
his feet and genitals."
3. In 1997, the National Guard had more counter-narcotics officers than the
DEA and conducted 1300 daily counter-drug operations with 4,000 troops.
| [DrugWarFacts.org] |
- [And this is what made the National Guard attractive
for the last ten years or more. Lots of action and few if
any casualties as most drug users never resist arrest
or search. I've never ever heard of a National Guard
killed or even wounded by drug users. But they
wanted action and now they're getting a lethal dose of
it. Not by going after unarmed drug users, but
resistance fighters in Iraq. Now that they are being
shot at and are dying, guard enlistment is down. -dm]
- “There is a nationwide
epidemic of police
brutality in the United
States. People are shot
and killed with little or no
provocation. They die
from choke holds, hog
tying, pepper-spray,
beatings and high speed
car chases. They die on
the streets, in their own
homes, on the border, in
jails and prisons. The
officers involved are
almost never indicted,
prosecuted, or punished
in any way. Police
generally say they had
"no choice but to shoot."
Killed by Law Enforcement (Second Edition) documents over 2,000 cases. |
And where do federal law enforcement learn their procedures?
[Click here to continue] From the intelligence agencies.
[Click here to continue] From the intelligence agencies.